The legal issues presented in this case will be displayed here.

This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

A 1988 Arizona ballot initiative established English as the official language of the State. The ballot passed. The measure became effective on December 5 as Arizona State Constitution Article XXVIII. The Article declares that, with specified exceptions, the State 'shall act in English and in no other language.' The exceptions concern compliance with federal laws, participation in certain educational programs, protection of the rights of criminal defendants and crime victims, and protection of public health or safety. Article XXVIII grants standing to any person residing or doing business in the State 'to bring suit to enforce the Article' in state court, under such 'reasonable limitations' as 'the Legislature may enact.' Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez (P), then an insurance claims manager in the Arizona Department of Administration's Risk Management Division, sued the State of Arizona (D) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal District Court. P added as defendants, in their individual and official capacities, Arizona Governor Rose Mofford, Arizona Attorney General Robert K. Corbin, and the Director of Arizona's Department of Administration, Catherine Eden. P brought suit as an individual and never sought designation as a class representative. P was bilingual in English and Spanish. P asserted that Article XXVIII violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. P requested injunctive and declaratory relief, counsel fees, and 'all other relief that the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.' Ds moved to dismiss. The State of Arizona asserted immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The individual Ds asserted the absence of a case or controversy because 'none of [them] had threatened [P] concerning her use of Spanish in the performance of her job duties [or had] ever told her not to use Spanish [at work].' Ds claimed that novel state-law questions concerning the meaning and application of Article XXVIII should be tendered first to the state courts. The State Attorney General released an opinion construing Article XXVIII and explaining why he found the measure constitutional. It was the Attorney General's view that government employees remained free to use other languages 'to facilitate the delivery of governmental services.' Ds stipulated that 'the efficient operation [and administration] of the State is enhanced by permitting State service employees to communicate with citizens of the State in languages other than English where the citizens are not proficient in English.' The court dismissed the State of Arizona as a defendant, accepting the State's plea of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court determined that only the Governor, in her official capacity, was a proper party. The Attorney General, the District Court found, had no authority under Arizona law to enforce provisions like Article XXVIII against state employees. D reiterated that P faced no actual or threatened injury attributable to any Arizona executive branch officer, and hence presented no genuine case or controversy. The court found Article XXVIII fatally overbroad. The District Court concluded, 'the Attorney General's interpretation . . . is simply at odds with Article XXVIII's plain language.' The District Court ultimately dismissed all parties save P and Governor Mofford (D) in her official capacity, then declared Article XXVIII unconstitutional as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but denied P's request for an injunction because 'she had not established an enforcement threat sufficient to warrant [such] relief.' The Arizonans for Official English Committee (AOE) and Robert D. Park, Chairman of AOE (Ds) moved to intervene as defendants in order to urge on appeal the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. The District Court observed first that the movants had failed to file a pleading 'setting forth their claim or defense,' as required by Rule 24(c). It held that the labor and resources AOE spent to promote the ballot initiative did not suffice to establish standing to sue or defend in a federal tribunal. The District Court ruled, that the interests of voters who favored the initiative were too general to meet traditional standing criteria. It held that AOE and Park would not be precluded by the federal declaration from pursuing 'any future state court proceeding [based on] Article XXVIII.' The Court of Appeals held AOE and Park met Article III requirements and could proceed as appellants. The Ninth Circuit maintained AOE as the principal sponsor of the ballot initiative, qualified to defend Article XXVIII on appeal. P resigned from state employment in order to accept another job. Arizona's Attorney General so informed the Ninth Circuit in September 1991, 'suggesting that this case may lack a viable plaintiff and, hence, may be moot.' The Ninth Circuit rejected the mootness suggestion holding '[her] constitutional claims may entitle her to an award of nominal damages.' P's complaint did 'not expressly request nominal damages. The case file was returned to the District Court on November 5, 1992; AOE and Park filed their second notice of appeal. The Ninth Circuit allowed intervention and appeal. The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed declaring Article XXVIII unconstitutional and remanded the case, directing the District Court to award P nominal damages. The en banc Court of Appeals condemned the provision as manifestly overbroad, trenching untenably on the speech rights of Arizona officials and public employees. It held that P was 'entitled to nominal damages.' AOE and Park appealed.

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Legal analysis from Dean's Law Dictionary will be displayed here.