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D was originally indicted for murder made capital because the victim was under 14 years of age. The trial court instructed the jury on felony murder predicated on the felony of aggravated child abuse as a lesser-included offense of the capital murder charge. D objected to the instruction, arguing that, under the merger doctrine, the offense of aggravated child abuse merged with the homicide and, therefore, could not serve as the predicate felony for felony murder. The court overruled the objection and, on appeal, a majority of the Court held that the merger doctrine did not apply to aggravated child abuse under the facts in Contreras's case. At the time of the crime, aggravated child abuse was not a predicate felony specifically enumerated in § 13A-6-2(a)(3) but fell under the residual clause of 'any other felony clearly dangerous to human life.' “any other felony clearly dangerous to human life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant if there be any, causes the death of any person.'…D’s petition alleged that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing at trial and on direct appeal that the phrase 'any other felony clearly dangerous to human life' is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The court dismissed his petition. D appealed.

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