Crawford v. City Of Bakersfield

944 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019)

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Facts

At around 12:30 p.m. on August 6, 2014, Elsa Torres was filling up her tank at a gas station. Dozer approached Torres's vehicle and removed the gas nozzle from the tank, spraying some gas on her in the process. Dozer then sprayed gas onto the ground around himself and set it on fire, creating a flame that Torres said went 'maybe up to his knees.' Dozer also took off some of his clothes. Torres drove away, called 911, and told the operator that there was a man 'trying to burn us.' While Torres was waiting for the police to arrive, she saw Dozer go over to the area outside a nearby minimart and start 'knocking all the stuff down, like the newspaper stands and stuff.' Officer Stringer was on patrol alone when he received a call through dispatch that 'a subject at the gas station . . . had poured gasoline on a woman and tried to light her on fire' and that the woman's children were in her car. He received a second call indicating that a woman 'had been lit on fire and that she put it out and left the scene.' It took Stringer '[m]aybe a couple of minutes' to get to the gas station. Stringer and Dozer exchanged words. Stringer testified that he concluded that Dozer was 'under the influence of a narcotic and was visibly agitated' and that the situation would 'most likely . . . escalate quickly,' leading him to call for expedited backup. Stringer stopped about twenty feet away from Dozer and told him to get on the ground. Stringer testified that Dozer then began moving toward him 'very quickly,' picked up a horseshoe-shaped bike lock, raised it over his head, ignored an order to put it down, and started 'charging' toward him 'quicker than [he] could back up.' Stringer started backing up and drew his handgun. Stringer was also carrying three nonlethal weapons: a Taser that could fire darts at a range of up to twenty-six feet, pepper spray, and a collapsible baton. Stringer claimed that those alternatives were not viable because they would take too long to deploy, as Dozer was approaching him 'with a deadly weapon,' the bike lock. Less than a minute after arriving on the scene, Stringer shot Dozer. The first backup officer to arrive, George Vasquez, was pulling up in his car when he saw the shooting. Vasquez did not see Stringer backpedaling at any point. He did, however, see Dozer moving toward Stringer, and he believed based on Dozer's 'facial demeanor' and 'rapid movement,' as well as the fact that Dozer was holding the bike lock 'over his head,' that Dozer intended to harm Stringer. Vasquez testified that Dozer and Stringer were about five to ten feet apart at the time of the shooting. Cabrera, Montiel, and Torres-gave varying accounts of the lead-up to the shooting, including testimony that conflicted with each other's and the officers' accounts as to whether and how quickly Dozer was moving toward Stringer; whether Dozer was holding the bike lock at his side, holding it in his raised hand, or swinging it at Stringer; how close Dozer got to Stringer; and whether Stringer stayed put or backed away as Dozer approached. P sued Ds under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both sides used expert witnesses at trial. P’s expert claimed that Stringer was trained enough to recognize mental illness and that Stringer did the exact opposite of what he should have done. Ds’ expert claimed that Dozer posed an immediate threat and Stringer complied with applicable standards and acted properly. At her pretrial deposition, P testified that Dozer suffered from schizophrenia. Ds moved in limine to exclude 'any reference that Dozer was schizophrenic or suffered from any mental illness,' arguing (as relevant here) that the evidence was irrelevant and an improper lay opinion. The district court granted Ds' motion. The court rejected Ds' argument that any evidence of mental illness was necessarily irrelevant, reasoning that whether Dozer's behavior 'was due to being under the influence of a drug such as PCP' or to mental illness 'is relevant to determining whether the force used in this instance was reasonable.' The court barred P from testifying about her observations of Dozer's past behavior, reasoning that because Stringer had no prior knowledge of Dozer, P's observations were 'not relevant to the issue of whether [Stringer] should have known that [Dozer's] behavior [leading up to the shooting] could have been caused by mental illness.' The jury returned a special verdict finding that P failed to prove that Stringer used excessive force or was negligent, and the district court entered judgment for Ds. P appealed.

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