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P alleges that he was sexually abused by his Boy Scout leader, Swensen (D), approximately 30 years earlier, when P was a minor. From 1965 to 1967, Swensen (D) was a volunteer Boy Scout leader, duly authorized by the Boy Scouts to act as such. P and his family became close to Swensen (D), and Swensen (D) was a frequent guest in their home. Swensen (D) gained the trust and confidence of P's family as a suitable friend, guide, mentor, and role model to P. Swensen (D) spent substantial periods of time alone with P. Swensen (D) used his position of trust to touch P physically. Swensen (D) committed a series of sexual assaults on P. In 1995, P brought the present action against Swensen (D) as well as D, claiming that Swensen (D) had sexually abused him from 1965 until 1967. The complaint alleges that D is vicariously liable for Swensen's (D) tortious conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior and that D is directly liable or negligently failing to have implemented a screening program to prevent child abusers from becoming Boy Scout leaders. D moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that both claims are time-barred and that the complaint fails to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a tort claim for vicarious liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. The trial court granted the motion as to both claims. P appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It concluded that P's direct liability negligence claim is time-barred because the complaint fails to allege conduct 'knowingly allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse' by the D as required. The complaint contains no facts from which it reasonably could be concluded that the sexual assaults on P were within the scope of Swensen's (D) employment. P appealed.

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