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P, a Black Pentecostal church in Connecticut, sought to reserve lodging at D for a church retreat. Merle Rumble and three other church members visited the Lancaster, Pennsylvania lodging. Bonnie Skagen, who worked for D sent a document confirming the number of rooms, dates, and price. P created a signup sheet for its members. At a later date, Skagen told Rumble that 40 rooms were not available. But a friend of the church, Judith Addington, who is white, made a reservation for 50 rooms under a fictional church group. This ruse confirmed discrimination against P and its members. Ps had to stay at another very substandard hotel with drug and prostitution problems. Ps claim that the mission of D was frustrated by the denial of accommodations at D. The mission of P included 'developing and fostering the spiritual welfare of its members,' 'addressing issues surrounding racial injustice,' and 'furthering fellowship, congeniality, and congregational vitality.' P attempted to enter into a contract with D. P was ready, willing, and able and had the specific intent to lodge at D. Ps also allege that Ds 'mailed two proposals for room reservations to P for the benefit of the Plaintiff Class,' and that Ds 'sent a proposal letter to P care of Merle Rumble to reserve rooms for the Plaintiff Class.' P expected and intended to enter into a contract with Ds for rooms and for the Plaintiff Class, to assume financial responsibility, and to make full payment for the reservations in order to guarantee the availability of space for the Plaintiff Class. Merle Rumble was told that 'a contract would be sent right away to P to guarantee space for the Plaintiff Class.' Ds 'failed to furnish to P … Ds' customary form seeking a list of names of the group members who intended to stay at the Lancaster Host pursuant to the reservation.' Ps allege that Ds failed to satisfy their obligation to provide them with rooms for the weekend of July 9-10, 2004. Ps argue that (1) both P and the individual plaintiffs were proposed parties to the contract, or (2) in the alternative, the individual plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the proposed contract between P and D. Ps sued Ds under 42 U.S.C. §1981. Ds moved to dismiss claiming in part that the individual members were not third party beneficiaries of a contract that never had been completed with P and that the individual members could not sue under §1981.

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