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This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

A dispute developed between P and Dr. Robert Sorensen, who at the time was chief of cardiology, chairman of the Department of Medicine, and a member of the Board of Governors at D. The dispute originated over the allocation of the reading of electrocardiograms (ECGs or EKGs), which, at $5 per reading, produced an annual income of approximately $75,000. D is the only hospital in Cape May County, and P is the only board-certified cardiologist in the county. Before P showed up in 1979, Dr. Sorensen, an internist, enjoyed a virtual monopoly on reading ECGs. P was allowed to read ECGs one day each week, but when he requested an additional day, Dr. Sorensen rejected his request. P criticized Dr. Sorensen, who retaliated. Things escalated and P allegedly committed a series of violations of D’s bylaws. On August 2, 1982, the medical staff executive committee 'voted unanimously to act toward the revocation of P's medical staff privileges.' That action marked the beginning of lengthy proceedings before D and before federal and state courts in this state. Pursuant to the hospital bylaws, the chairman of the medical staff executive committee requested the hospital executive committee to take corrective action. The executive committee forwarded the request to the chief of the Department of Medicine, who appointed an ad hoc committee to investigate the matter. The charges against P were captioned as 'Acts of Disruptive Behavior' and 'Failure to Cooperate with Hospital Personnel Regarding the Use of Facilities Especially During the Summer Months and the Emergent Admissions Procedures.' Bylaw provisions required a staff doctor to be of a temperament and disposition that will enable him to work in harmony with his colleagues on the Medical Staff; with the professional, technical, and other personnel in the hospital, and with the administration, accepting criticism without resentment and offering it in a spirit and manner that is constructive and devoid of offense and malice * * *. A bylaw provision stated that a staff member 'must enjoy the reputation of being an ethical and conscientious practitioner and must strictly abide by the Code of Ethics * * *.' At no time has D questioned P's technical competence. The ad hoc committee 'found against D and recommended 'his discharge from D, together with the permanent deprivation of D privileges.' The executive committee of the medical staff affirmed that finding. P appealed to an ad hoc committee of the medical staff, which unanimously found against him and recommended that he be dismissed from the staff of the hospital. D advised P of the revocation of his staff privileges. P sued and the Chancery Division found that the proceedings had not been conducted in accordance with the hospital's bylaws, enjoined the revocation of P's privileges, and remanded the matter for further proceedings to be conducted in accordance with D's bylaws. The Board of Governors appointed a hearing committee, which recommended on April 15, 1983, 'that the action of the medical staff in dismissing P be affirmed.' The Board affirmed the hearing committee's recommendation. On March 8, 1983, P instituted an action in the United States District Court. P got the judgment on an anti-trust claim against dl in the amount of $350,000, which was trebled, pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, for a total of $1,050,000. Dr. Sorensen recovered $100,000 compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages against P on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, $100,000 as compensatory damages, and $ 00,000 as punitive damages on a defamation claim. D recovered $100,000 compensatory damages and $50,000 punitive damages against P on its defamation claim. Under rule 50(b), the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of D and the executive committee, the effect of which was to vacate the $1,050,000 judgment recovered by P. P is obligated to D and Dr. Sorensen in the amount of $ 1,050,000. The matter is now on appeal before the Third Circuit. The Chancery Division found that the hearing committee, without notice to P, had held ex parte hearings, which 'violated fundamental fairness,' and again remanded the matter to D. The hearing committee again recommended revocation and the Board again approved the recommendation. The Chancery Division found that the proceedings were unfair. The Appellate Division affirmed the Chancery Division's finding that P had been deprived of a fair hearing, and D did not cross-petition for relief from the Appellate Division's judgment. P has never had a fair hearing on the revocation of his privileges. The court determined that P's staff privileges should not be revoked on the grounds of disharmony, absent a showing of actual interference with patient care, and concluded that the record did not support any such showing. Consequently, the court issued a permanent injunction against the revocation of his privileges. The Appellate Division held that the trial court, in reviewing the revocation of hospital staff privileges, should not have made independent findings of fact, but should have determined whether D's decision was supported by sufficient credible evidence. The Appellate Division ruled that mere disharmony, although an insufficient ground by itself, is a relevant consideration in revocation proceedings. It ruled that P was entitled to a fair hearing de novo before an impartial tribunal acting in good faith. This may require that a master be appointed by the trial court. P appealed to determine the appropriate standard of review of the decision by D to terminate a physician's staff privileges and to determine further whether actual interference with patient care is required in order to terminate those privileges.

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