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This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

Baby Jane Doe was born suffering from multiple birth defects. The most serious of which were myelomeningocele, commonly known as spina bifida, a condition in which the spinal cord and membranes that envelop it are exposed; microcephaly, an abnormally small head; and hydrocephalus, a condition characterized by an accumulation of fluid in the cranial vault. She exhibited a 'weak face', which prevents the infant from closing her eyes or making a full suck with her tongue; a malformed brain stem; upper extremity spasticity; and a thumb entirely within her fist. As a result of the spina bifida, her rectal, bladder, leg, and sensory functions were impaired. Due to the combination of microcephaly and hydrocephalus, there was an extremely high risk that she would be so severely retarded that she could never interact with her environment or with other people. Surgery to correct her spina bifida and hydrocephalus was possible and was likely to prolong the infant's life, but would not improve many of her handicapping conditions, including her anticipated mental retardation. The surgical procedures involved a great risk of depriving the infant of what little function remains in her legs, and would also result in recurring urinary tract and possibly kidney infections, skin infections, and edemas of the limbs. The parents decided to forego the corrective surgery opting for good nutrition, the administration of antibiotics, and the dressing of the baby's exposed spinal sac. A. Lawrence Washburn, Jr., a Vermont attorney unrelated to the child and her family, commenced a proceeding in New York State Supreme Court seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child and an order directing D to perform the corrective surgery. The court appointed William E. Weber as guardian ad litem and concluded that surgery was necessary and ordered that it be performed. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the proceeding. The 'concededly concerned and loving parents have made an informed, intelligent, and reasonable determination based upon and supported by responsible medical authority.' The Appellate Division determined that the parents' decision was in the best interest of the infant and that there was no basis for judicial intervention. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. It found found 'no precedent or authority' for a third party stranger to take a proceeding on behalf of the State. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by permitting the proceeding to go forward. P received a complaint from an unidentified 'private citizen' that Baby Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied medically indicated treatment on the basis of her handicaps. P referred the complaint to the New York State Child Protection Services and that agency concluded that there was no cause for state intervention. P repeatedly requested D to make available for inspection all of Baby Jane Doe's medical records. P based its authority to conduct an investigation on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides in pertinent part that 'no otherwise qualified handicapped individual * * * shall, solely by reason of his handicap, * * * be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance * *'. D refused. P brought this action claiming D had violated Section 504 and 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) by refusing to allow P access to information concerning the medical care and hospital services being rendered to Baby Jane Doe. D and the parents moved to dismiss the complaint. Congress did not intend Section 504 to reach decisions regarding health care services provided to infants; Section 504 imposes no affirmative treatment obligations on the hospital beyond providing handicapped persons equal access to its facilities, which the hospital had done; Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements do not constitute 'Federal financial assistance' within the meaning of Section 504; Baby Jane Doe's medical records were protected from disclosure by both her and her parents' federal constitutional privacy rights; and (5) The failure of the federal government to intervene in the state court proceedings barred the instant action under the doctrine of laches. Among the papers submitted in support of these motions was the entire record of the state court proceedings. P claimed the hospital's neonatal unit was a 'recipient' of 'Federal financial assistance' in the form of Medicaid was required to allow P access to information necessary to the discharge of the agency's statutory obligation to ensure compliance with Section 504. The court ruled that D 'lacks the legal right to perform such procedures' in the absence of parental consent and cannot possibly be regarded as a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. It then ruled that the parents had properly considered the best interests of the child. P claims the court erred in concluding that the parent's refusal to consent to surgery conclusively established the hospital's nondiscrimination and thus insulated the hospital from liability under Section 504. D argues that Section 504 provides no authority for this action, because (1) Medicare and Medicaid do not constitute 'Federal financial assistance' within the meaning of the statute and (2) congress did not intend that Section 504 serve as the basis for federal intervention in medical decisionmaking.

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