The court's holding and decision will be displayed here.

This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

Woodard’s (Ps) fifteen-day-old infant son, Austin, was diagnosed with retrosyncytial virus bronchiolitis, a life-threatening respiratory disease that attacks infants. Medical treatment included muscle relaxants and strong sedatives, mechanical ventilation and intubation, a feeding tube, and the placement of an arterial line in the femoral vein of the infant's right leg and a venous catheter inserted in the infant's left leg. The infant had made sufficient recovery that he was weaned from the sedatives and muscle relaxants. When he was moved from the intensive care unit to the general hospital ward, he became very agitated and he continuously cried. His left leg was purple in color and swollen as a result of the removal of the venous catheter from his left leg. An x-ray confirmed that deep vein thrombosis had developed in the left leg, a secondary condition to the venous catheter insertion. The x-ray also showed a fracture at the lower end of the femur in the infant's left leg. A subsequent skeletal survey revealed a fracture in the right leg, as well. The Medical Center's consultants were unable to determine the cause of the fractures. Ps sued Ds for claims of medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ds moved for summary disposition claiming in part that Ps' medical expert, Anthony Casamassima, was not a qualified expert because he was not specialized in pediatric critical care or pediatric emergency medicine specialties as were Ds. The motion was denied. After Ds deposed Dr. Casamassima, they filed four different motions. In part, Ds moved to strike Dr. Casamassima as an unqualified medical expert and to dismiss the case. Ps asserted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would allow an inference of negligence from the facts in this case. Ps argued that there was no need for an expert witness because an inference of negligence may be inferred from the fact that the infant was admitted with healthy legs only to leave with fractured legs. The trial court granted Ds' motion to strike Ps' expert witness, ruling that Dr. Casamassima was not qualified as a medical expert. Ps appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed but reversed the trial court's dismissal on the basis that expert testimony was unnecessary under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The case was remanded for trial. Ds sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals decision that res ipsa loquitur applies. Ps cross-appealed. In a second case (Hamilton v. Kuligowski) The P's proposed expert witness is board-certified in general internal medicine and devotes a majority of his professional time to treating infectious diseases, a subspecialty of internal medicine. The trial court granted D's motion for a directed verdict on the basis that P's expert is not qualified to testify against D because P's expert specializes in infectious diseases and did not devote a majority of his professional time to practicing or teaching general internal medicine. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that P's expert is qualified to testify against the defendant physician because both P's proposed expert witness and D specialize in internal medicine and because P's proposed expert did devote a majority of his professional time to the practice of internal medicine given that the treatment of infectious diseases is a subspecialty of internal medicine. Ds appealed.

The legal issues presented in this case will be displayed here.

Legal analysis from Dean's Law Dictionary will be displayed here.