Aguehounde v. District Of Columbia

666 A.2d 443 (1995)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P was struck by a car driven by Davis after he stepped into the crosswalk. P testified that as he approached the Fessenden St./Wisconsin Ave. intersection, and when he was three or four steps from the southeast corner of that intersection, he looked to his left and did not see any vehicles approaching from the west on Fessenden Street. He further testified that when he reached the corner, he saw that the light facing him was green and that cars, pointed in a westerly direction, were stopped to his right on Fessenden Street. He could not recall whether the 'walk' or 'don't walk' sign was on. P acknowledged that he did not stop at the corner before stepping into the crosswalk. He also stated that he did not remember looking to his left or seeing Davis's car approach him from that direction as he stepped into the intersection. Davis testified that the traffic light was still green and she was traveling approximately 20 miles per hour as she proceeded through the intersection in her easterly course on Fessenden St. She first noticed P standing on the curb as she passed through the intersection into the crosswalk. P then took a big step out in front of her car while it was in the crosswalk. Davis testified that P was looking away from her car and she never saw him look in her direction. She applied her brakes, but nonetheless struck P who landed 3-5 feet in front of her car. P sued D alleging that: D failed to follow the proper engineering standards in setting the length of the 'clearance interval' at the intersection; this failure caused d to set a clearance interval of too short a duration to allow cars to clear the intersection and the crosswalks; and consequently, Davis's car was still in the intersection when P stepped into the crosswalk on a green light. P got the verdict, but the D moved for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the timing of the light is a discretionary function immune from tort liability, and that P was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The judge granted the motion. P appealed.