Alyeska (D) and others submitted applications to the Department of Interior for rights-of-way for a pipeline that would transport oil from the North Slope across Alaska to the U.S. An amended application was submitted four months later in December 1969, which requested a 54-foot right-of-way along with special land use permits for the construction of a road along one segment of the pipeline. Wilderness (P) sued in March 1970 and sought declaratory relief against the Secretary of the Interior in that the right-of-way and special land use permits were in violation of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and not in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The district court granted the preliminary injunction against issuance of the right-of-way permits. The State of Alaska and Alyeska were allowed to intervene. Eventually, impact statements were issued and after the time for public comment was passed, the Secretary announced that the requested permits would be granted. The court then decided to dissolve the preliminary injunction and to deny a permanent injunction, and then it dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed basing its decision on the Mineral Leasing Act. It declined to decide P’s contentions regarding the NEPA rejections. Congress then enacted legislation which amended the Mineral Leasing Act to allow granting of permits to D and declared that no further action under NEPA was necessary for construction to begin. The merits of the litigation was thus terminated by congressional action. The Court of Appeals then turned to the questions involved in P’s request for attorney fees. There was no applicable statutory authorization for such an award, and thus, the court considered exceptions to the established American rule that a prevailing party was not entitled to recovery of attorney fees. The court found no bad faith by Ds. The court did hold that Ps had acted to vindicate important statutory rights of all citizens, and had ensured that the governmental system functioned properly. The Court of Appeals found that Ps were entitled to attorneys’ fees as a part of the public good to encourage such lawsuits against well-financed companies. Since attorney fees were barred against the U.S. and it was deemed inappropriate to saddle Alaska with them, the court then held that D could be fairly required to pay ½ of the full award as Ps were performing the functions of private attorney general.