Nature of the Case
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Facts
Anderson (P) and Schwegel (D) met to discuss the restoration of P’s 1935 Plymouth. They orally agreed that D would restore the car for $6,000. Each of the parties had a different understanding of what that word meant. P understood restore to mean the complete restoration of the car, except for upholstery. D intended that restore only meant the work for the body but that any engine work would be additional. They did not attempt to reduce their agreement to writing, and neither was aware of the misunderstanding. In 1981, D informed P that substantial engine work was needed. Upon P’s approval, D sent the car to K&F to repair the engine. P discussed the repairs with K&F but did not question whether the engine costs were part of the $6,000. In December of 1982, P got an itemized account of the work completed to date. The statement exceeded the $6,000 by more than $2,000, and P expressed no disagreement with it. P then tendered a payment of $2,000 in addition to the $3,000 he had already paid. P and D had another conversation for making the car roadworthy, and P assented to having the work done. D sublet the work to Rick Vance Auto. The final bill included $5,896.01 for bodywork, $2,184.57 for engine overhaul and $1,719.69 for roadworthy repairs. The total came to $9,800.27. P had already paid $5,000, and when D demanded payment of the balance, P refused stating that only $1,000 remained due. P then sued D to enforce the contract and to recover possession of the car. D counterclaimed for the full amount of the bill. The magistrate determined that the parties had failed to reach a meeting of the minds and that no contract existed between them. The magistrate then held that P was liable to D under quasi-contract for the balance of the bill for the reasonable value of the service rendered. P appealed. The judgment was affirmed by the district court. P appealed.
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