City Of Seattle v. Erickson

188 Wash.2d 721, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017)

Facts

Officer Clay observed D walking down the sidewalk backward and with a knife drawn, followed by several other individuals. Clay and his partner followed D into the Pacific Place shopping center, drew their weapons, and ordered D to drop the knife. D complied but refused to follow the officers' instructions to lay face down on the floor. After a prolonged physical struggle throughout which D refused the officers' commands and resisted their physical efforts to restrain him, the officers subdued him and took him into custody. D was charged with unlawful use of a weapon and resisting arrest. After voir dire, each party exercised three peremptory strikes. After voir dire, each party exercised three peremptory strikes. P used one of those strikes against the only black juror on the panel. D made no objections at the time. The six-person jury was subsequently seated, the rest of the venire excused, the jury sworn in, and the jury dismissed for the day. D then objected to the striking of juror 5 pursuant to Batson, noting it was the first opportunity he had to do so without being “directly in front of the jury.” D claimed that the striking of the only juror from a cognizable racial group made a prima facie case that the juror was struck based on race. P claimed that D had waived his right to a Batson challenge, claiming the objection was brought after the venire had been dismissed and the jury excused for the day, thereby making the objection untimely. P claimed that Batson stands for the “proposition that there needed to be a pattern or practice of discrimination.” P claimed the act of striking a single juror could not constitute such a pattern. The court found that D had not waived the Batson challenge but had not presented a prima facie case for discrimination. It held there were a number of other jurors from “constitutionally cognizable groups” who remained on both the panel and the venire after the strike. D was convicted on both counts. The superior court affirmed the finding that the circumstances surrounding the challenge did not raise any inference that the juror was struck because of his race. The Court of Appeals denied discretionary review. D appealed.