Nature of the Case
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Facts
D was driving a Ford passenger when, by his admission, he fell asleep. D claimed he awoke just before the van collided with the rear end of another car. The front left section of the van struck the right rear portion of the car and the van veered sharply to the right, crossed the right travel lane, and went onto the right shoulder of the road where it hit an embankment. The van rode up the embankment, flipped, and came to rest on its passenger side, half on the right shoulder of the highway, and half on the right lane of travel. There were twenty-one minors. in the van along with three adults. All but one of the minors was under the age of twelve. Two of the children were killed in the crash and numerous others were taken to various hospitals with injuries. The van had only fifteen-passenger seats. Some of the passengers were seated on the floor. None of the passengers was restrained by a seatbelt and D's approximate speed was at least seventy-eight m.p.h., well in excess of the posted speed limit of fifty-five m.p.h. D was charged in part with involuntary manslaughter, and two counts of homicide by vehicle. The court held that P had met its prima facie burden for the charges of homicide by vehicle, but dismissed the charges of aggravated assault, involuntary manslaughter, and reckless endangerment. For the involuntary manslaughter charges, the trial court held that the P had failed to make out a prima facie case for the mens rea (recklessness or gross negligence) necessary to support such a charge. P appealed and the court affirmed the dismissal of the involuntary manslaughter charges, finding that P had failed to show that D had consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his actions. It held that the involuntary manslaughter statute appears to set forth disjunctive bases for establishing the mental state necessary for conviction -- i.e., recklessness or gross negligence. P had failed to prove that D 'had reason to believe that he was dangerously tired before falling asleep.' The dissent noted that the definition of 'recklessness' contemplates that the actor engaged in a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element at issue exists or will result from his conduct. 'Conscious disregard' of a risk, in turn, involves first becoming aware of the risk and then choosing to proceed in spite of the risk. The dissent held that 'by continuing to drive after receiving the warning signs of sleep, a person does indeed consciously disregard a substantial risk of death on our highways.' P appealed.
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