Under D's zoning plan, churches and other religious institutions looking to relocate to a R-1 Residential District must apply for a variance. The variance standard requires the applicant to demonstrate unnecessary hardship by showing that: '(1) the physical features of the property are such that it cannot be used for a permitted purpose; or (2) that the property can be conformed for a permitted use only at a prohibitive expense; or (3) that the property has no value for any purpose permitted by the zoning ordinance.' Religious institutions are permitted, by right, to locate in areas designated by the Ordinance as either CS-Community Service Districts or M-Mixed Use Districts, and by special exception in A-O Apartment/Office Districts. The property in question was used as a convent and was capable of housing over eighty Sisters. Monks rented the property, and the Board granted a variance but required that the property deed be restricted to prevent further subdivision. P entered into an agreement with the Sisters to purchase the property for use as a place of worship. P sought either a variance, a special exception, or permission to use the property as an existing nonconforming use. Proposed uses included Shabbat services, Hebrew classes, religious meetings, Bar and Bat Mitzvah services, outdoor wedding ceremonies, and other similar celebrations and receptions. P also planned to expand the existing parking from twenty spaces to at least one hundred and thirty-seven spaces. D was denied in that its use differed from the Sisters' use and would cause more traffic, noise, and other neighborhood disruptions and P failed to demonstrate unnecessary hardship. P sued seeking injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief. P alleged violation of the right to free exercise of religion, freedom of assembly, and free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as Equal Protection and Due Process. P sued under state law and also for violation of RLUIPA claiming that Ds imposed a substantial burden on the P's free exercise of religion. P moved for partial summary judgment on their claim that the Ordinance is unreasonable on its face because it prohibits houses of worship from locating in residential neighborhoods. The Court held that the Ordinance, as applied, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. D had no rational reason to allow some uses by special exception but not P's; Distinguishing between country clubs, P's use, were not rationally related to the goal of preventing traffic, noise and light pollution in the neighborhood. D was ordered to conduct hearings on the Plaintiffs' application for a special exception. D appealed, and the case was reversed and sent back for further considerations.