P did not attend law school. Instead, he pursued an alternative path to a legal career provided by the State of Virginia involving a highly structured program of study in the office of a practicing attorney. P formally audited classes at the University of Virginia School of Law. For the final six months of his alternative course of study, P served as a law clerk to a United States District Judge. P passed the Virginia bar examination and was admitted to that State's Bar in April 1976. P began working as a staff attorney for the Baltimore, Md., Legal Aid Bureau. He continued in that job until January 1977. Maryland has a rule limiting access to the bar examination to graduates of ABA-approved law schools, but the Maryland Board of Law Examiners waived the rule for P. P passed the Maryland examination and later was admitted to that State's Bar. P applied to the Committee on Admissions of the District of Columbia Bar for admission to the District Bar under a rule which, prior to its recent amendment, allowed a member of a bar in another jurisdiction to seek membership in the District Bar without examination. The Committee denied P's application on the ground that he had not graduated from an approved law school. The Committee stated that only the District of Columbia Court of Appeals could waive the requirement of graduation from an approved law school. P submitted a petition for admission to the bar without examination. The answer was silence for many months. P had an attorney submit a letter to the Court that barring P from the practice of law merely because he has not graduated from an accredited law school would raise important questions under the United States Constitution and the federal antitrust laws -- questions that P was prepared to pursue in the United States District Court if necessary.' The Chief Judge decided not to waive the rule and upheld the Committee's denial. P filed a complaint in the United States District Court challenging the refusal to waive Rule 46I(b)(3). P sought 'a declaration that Ds' actions have violated the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and the Sherman Act and an order to allow him to sit for the next bar examination. The District Court granted Ds' motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. It held that the denial was a judicial act 'which fully encompassed the constitutional and statutory issues raised.' Another party, Hickey (P), thought that prior waivers for graduates of unaccredited law schools would be granted. P submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for waiver of Rule 46I(b)(3) so that he could sit for the bar examination. Hickey (P) stated that his 20 years of military service had demonstrated 'far beyond that of the average bar exam candidate, that he possesses the qualities essential to a good lawyer, including judgment, maturity, courage in the face of adversity, concern for his fellow man, commitment to our society and attention to detail.' The court issued a per curiam order denying Hickey’s (P) petition for a waiver. Hickey (P) filed a complaint in the United States District Court alleging that the denial of his petition violated the Fifth Amendment and the federal antitrust laws. The District Court granted Ds' motion to dismiss Hickey's (P) complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ps appealed the dismissals of their complaints to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court concluded that proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 'were not judicial in the federal sense, and thus did not foreclose litigation of the constitutional contentions in the District Court.' It reversed the dismissals. The court found that the District Court has jurisdiction over these cases because the proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 'were not judicial. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals appealed.