Gerald (P), the husband of Sandra instituted the action against Donna (D), his daughter. D and Sandra were returning from Newark, and the weather was clear, and the road dry. As the car approached the end of the curve, it left the road, struck a guardrail, flew about fifty feet in the air, collided with some trees, and landed on its roof. Sandra was severely injured. D had only minor injuries. D denied that she had been the driver. D claimed that her mother had swerved to avoid a head-on collision with a vehicle coming at them in their lane. Sandra claimed that D had been the driver. The detective concluded that d had been the driver because her shoe was wedged under the brake pedal, the minimal damage to the driver's side, the heavy damage to the passenger's side, the correlation of that damage to the injuries sustained by Sandra, the lack of injury to D, Sandra's position in the car, and her assertion that D had been driving. D got a summons for careless driving. Without entering a court appearance, D pled guilty to careless driving and paid a $60 fine. At trial, P's case on liability consisted of testimony by the police officers and evidence of D's guilty plea to the careless-driving charge. D could not recall anything about the accident. The court generally charged the law of negligence, stated that the mere occurrence of an accident did not give rise to an inference of negligence, and explained variously that a jury finding of a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97 was both evidence of negligence and negligence itself. P's counsel did not request a res ipsa loquitur charge. The jury found that D had been driving, but that she had not been negligent. This was reversed. On appeal, D urges that the trial court's failure to charge res ipsa loquitur did not constitute plain error.