Nature of the Case
To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.
Facts
After 911 Congress adopted a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to 'use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks ... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.' Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The President issued a comprehensive military order intended to govern the 'Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,' 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (hereinafter November 13 Order or Order). D was detained on the battlefield as an enemy combatant. The President announced his determination that D and five other detainees at Guantanamo Bay were triable by military commission. Military counsel was appointed to represent D. Two months later, counsel filed demands for charges and a speedy trial pursuant to Article 10 of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. §810. That application was denied. D was not entitled to any of the protections of the UCMJ. A charging document against D, which is unsigned, contains 13 numbered paragraphs. They describe al Qaeda's activities from its inception in 1989 through 2001 and identify Osama bin Laden as the group's leader. D is not mentioned in these paragraphs. The final two paragraphs, entitled 'Charge: Conspiracy,' contain allegations against D. Paragraph 12 charges Hamdan 'willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to commit the following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism.' There is no allegation that Hamdan had any command responsibilities, played a leadership role, or participated in the planning of any activity. Paragraph 13 lists four 'overt acts.' It is alleged that (1) he acted as Osama bin Laden's 'bodyguard and personal driver,' 'believing' all the while that bin Laden 'and his associates were involved in' terrorist acts prior to and including the attacks of September 11, 2001; (2) he arranged for transportation of, and actually transported, weapons used by al Qaeda members and by bin Laden's bodyguards; (3) he 'drove or accompanied Osama bin Laden to various al Qaida-sponsored training camps, press conferences, or lectures,' at which bin Laden encouraged attacks against Americans; and (4) he received weapons training at al Qaeda-sponsored camps. The District Court granted D's petition for habeas corpus and stayed the commission's proceedings. It concluded that the President's authority to establish military commissions extends only to 'offenders or offenses triable by military [commission] under the law of war.' It held that the law of war includes the Geneva Convention (III) and that D is entitled to the full protections of the Third Geneva Convention until adjudged, in compliance with that treaty, not to be a prisoner of war; and that, whether or not Hamdan is properly classified as a prisoner of war, the military commission convened to try him was established in violation of both the UCMJ and Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention because it had the power to convict based on evidence the accused would never see or hear. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the military commission convened to try D has authority to do so and whether D may rely on the Geneva Conventions in these proceedings. The Government (P) filed a motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari. The ground cited for dismissal was the recently enacted Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).
Support@ bsmsphd.com
Casebriefs Co