P suffered a brain injury in a motorcycle accident. She was subsequently adjudicated to be incompetent, resulting in a guardian being appointed by the court. P's guardianship was terminated based upon a letter from her treating physician, Kenneth Viste. Viste opined that P had recovered to the point where she had ongoing memory, showed good judgment, was reasonable in her goals and plans and could manage her own affairs. Her monthly income after the accident was $900, which consisted of social security disability and interest income from a mutual fund worth approximately $80,000. D loaned Ben Eilbes $7600 to start a small business. Eilbes was denied an additional $000 loan from the Bank. Eilbes was in default on the loan. Eilbes met P through her daughter, who told Eilbes about the existence of P's mutual fund. Eilbes discussed his business with P on several occasions, and P expressed an interest in becoming an investor in the business. P could only sell her stocks at certain times, so Eilbes suggested that she take out a short-term loan using the stocks as collateral. Eilbes told P that if she loaned him money, he would give her a job, pay her interest on the loan and pay the loan when it came due. P agreed. P contacted D and told D all the details. Eilbes told D that he would use the money invested by P in part to either bring the payments current on his defaulted loan or pay the loan off in full. D then called P's stockbroker and financial consultant, Stephen Landolt, in an effort to verify the existence of P's fund. Landolt told D that P needed the interest income to live on and that he wished D would not use it as collateral for a loan. D also conceded that it was possible that Landolt told him that P was suffering from brain damage, but did not specifically recall that part of their conversation. D would be willing to loan P $30,000. D gave Eilbes a loan application to give to P to fill out. P and Eilbes went to meet with D and sign the necessary paperwork. Prior to this date, D had not spoken to or met with P. During this meeting, D explained the terms of the loan to P--that she would sign a consumer single-payment note due in six months and give D a security interest in her mutual fund as collateral. D did not notice anything that would cause him to believe that P did not understand the loan transaction. On April 26, 1990, the date the loan matured, P filed suit against D and Eilbes. P subsequently amended her complaint three times. D filed a counterclaim for judgment on the defaulted loan. In the third amended complaint, P alleged the following specific causes of action: (1) D knew or should have known that she lacked the mental capacity to understand the loan, (2) D intentionally misrepresented, negligently misrepresented, or misrepresented the circumstances surrounding the loan on which she relied, and (3) D breached a fiduciary duty owed to her. D moved for summary judgment on the grounds that P failed to state any claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court dismissed P's misrepresentation claims. P dismissed Eilbes because he appeared to be judgment proof and was filing bankruptcy. A twelve-person jury subsequently found that P lacked the mental capacity to enter into the loan and that D failed to act in good faith. The trial court denied D's motions after verdict and entered judgment voiding the loan contract, dismissing D's counterclaim and ordering D to return P's collateral. D appeals.