Iowa v. Tovar

Facts

On November 2, 1996, D was a 21-year-old college student. D was for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). D had a blood alcohol level of 0.194. Some hours after his arrest, D appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court. D appeared without counsel and waived application for court-appointed counsel. D was released from jail. At the November 18 arraignment, D again appeared without counsel, and when queried by the court he indicated he wanted to plead guilty. D affirmed that he had not been promised anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty. The Court then proceeded to conduct the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court explained how D would be giving up his right to a speedy, public, trial by jury and would be giving up the right to be represented by an attorney who could help select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf.' The court further advised D that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain silent at trial, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony. The court then informed D that a DUI conviction carried a maximum penalty of a year in jail and a $1,000 fine, and a minimum penalty of two days in jail and a $500 fine. D affirmed that he understood his exposure to those penalties. The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was guilty of the charged offense. The court informed D that the DUI charge had only two elements: first, on the date in question, D was operating a motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second when he did so, he was intoxicated. D confirmed that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute the results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood-alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. The court then asked D if he still wished to plead guilty, and D affirmed that he did. The court then accepted the plea, observing that there was 'a factual basis' for it and that D had made the plea 'voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, [and] ... of the consequences of [pleading guilty].' On December 30, 1996, D appeared for sentencing for the DUI charge and, simultaneously, for arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license. D was again asked if he wanted to be represented by counsel. The court again engaged in the plea colloquy. The court then accepted D's guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court sentenced him on both counts: For the DUI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two days in jail and a $500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension conviction, the court imposed a $250 fine, plus a surcharge and costs. On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of DUI for a second time. He was represented by counsel in that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged with DUI this time as a third offense, and driving while license barred. Third-offense DUI's rank as class 'D' felonies. Represented by an attorney, D pleaded not guilty to both December 2000 charges. D then filed a Motion urging that his first DUI not be used to enhance the December 2000 charge from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. D maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid--not 'full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary'--because he 'was never made aware by the court ... of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.' The court denied the motion. D was found guilty and received a 180-day jail term, with all but 30 days suspended, three years of probation, and a $2,500 fine plus surcharges and costs. For driving while license barred, D received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the DUI sentence, and a suspended $500 fine. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed. Iowa's highest court acknowledged that 'the dangers of proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a jury trial, [therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be different.' It reversed. A defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked. The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments.' P appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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