Nature of the Case
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Facts
The State here seeks the civil commitment of Michael Crane (D), a previously convicted sexual offender who, according to at least one of the State's psychiatric witnesses, suffers from both exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. D was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery for two incidents that took place on the same day in 1993. In the first, D exposed himself to a tanning salon attendant. In the second, 30 minutes later, D entered a video store, waited until he was the only customer present, and then exposed himself to the clerk. Not stopping there, he grabbed the clerk by the neck, demanded she perform oral sex on him, and threatened to rape her. The State filed a petition in State District Court to have D evaluated and adjudicated a sexual predator under the SVPA. That Act permits the civil detention of a person convicted of any of several enumerated sexual offenses, if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he suffers from a “mental abnormality” - a disorder affecting his “emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses” - or a “personality disorder,” either of “which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.” Several psychologists determined that D suffers from exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. Though exhibitionism alone would not support classification as a sexual predator, a psychologist concluded that the two in combination did place D's condition within the range of disorders covered by the SVPA. D moved for summary judgment, arguing that for his detention to comport with substantive due process the State was required to prove not merely what the statute requires - that by reason of his mental disorder he is “likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence” - but also that he is unable to control his violent behavior. The trial court denied this motion and instructed the jury pursuant to the terms of the statute. The jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that respondent was a sexual predator as defined by the SVPA. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed. It held that the Federal Constitution as interpreted in Hendricks insists upon “a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior” - even if (as provided by Kansas law) problems of “emotional capacity” and not “volitional capacity” prove the “source of bad behavior” warranting commitment. Kansas now argues that the Kansas Supreme Court wrongly read Hendricks as requiring the State always to prove that a dangerous individual is completely unable to control his behavior. That reading, says Kansas, is far too rigid.
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