Mentor (P) sold an emulator to Quickturn (D) in 1992. P then decided to re-enter the emulation business and began to market a product from a French company called Meta. D then commenced a proceeding before the ITC claiming that Meta and P were infringing on D’s patents. D prevailed, and P was barred from competing with D. P then began to look at acquiring D. If P owned D, it could also own the patents and could then seek to vacate D’s injunctive order against P in the patent litigation. P then hired Arthur Anderson to get advice on how to compete in the emulation marketplace. The report identified advantages and benefits P would get if it acquired D. The bottom line was that if P acquired D, it could realize about $610 million in value and should probably bid $300 million for D. P retained Salomon Smith Barney to act as its financial advisor. Salomon’s study said that D’s price was so high that a takeover bid was not feasible. Later that year the stock price of D declined, and P decided to make a public bid to purchase D. The evening before the bid, the chairman of P informed D’s chairman that he would be launching a hostile tender offer the next morning. At no prior time did P ever attempt to contact D to negotiate a consensual deal. P then announced its unsolicited offer at $12.125 per share, which was a 50% premium over D’s immediate pre-offer price but a 20% discount from D’s February 1998 stock levels. P also announced its intent to solicit proxies to replace the board at a special meeting. P began soliciting agent designations from D shareholders to satisfy D’s by-law’s stock ownership requirement for such a meeting. D’s board determined, after three meetings, that P’s offer was inadequate and recommended to reject. At an August 21st meeting, the board adopted two defensive measures. The board amended Article II, which allowed for a stockholder holding 10% or more of D’s stock to call a special meeting of the stockholders. The Amendment provided that if any such meeting was requested, D would fix the record date, and it must take place within 90-100 days after a valid determination of the request. The board also eliminated its dead hand feature and replaced it with a Deferred Redemption Plan (DRP) under which no newly elected board could redeem the Rights Plan for six months after taking office if the purpose or effect would be to facilitate a transaction with an interested person (one who proposed, nominated or financially supported the election of the new directors to the board). P would be just such a person. The combined effect would be to delay any acquisition of D by P for nine months. P filed an action for declaratory relief to hold that these new measures were invalid and for an injunction to dismantle them. D moved for summary judgment, and the court denied that motion. A trial was held on October 19-28, 1998. After the trial, P announced that it had received tenders of D shares, which with the shares that P already owned, represented over 51% of the outstanding stock of D. The court concluded that the bylaw amendment was valid but held that DRP was not.