Mydlach v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation

875 N.E.2d 1047 (2007)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On June 20, 1998, P purchased a used 1996 Dodge Neon. It was originally put into service on June 24, 1996, with a three-year/36,000-mile limited warranty. The car's mileage was 26,296. Thus, the warranty had approximately one year or 10,000 miles remaining. Beginning July 7, 1998, P brought the car to McGrath and another authorized dealership several times for a variety of problems, including a recurring fluid leak. The repair attempts were unsuccessful and, as a result, she could not use the vehicle as intended. P used D on May 16, 2001, seeking legal and equitable relief, as well as attorney fees and costs, under the Magnuson-Moss Act. P sued for breach of written warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and revocation of acceptance. D argued that the first two counts were subject to the four-year statute of limitations found in UCC section 2-725. Since the statute of limitations commenced upon 'tender of delivery' of the vehicle to its original purchaser in June 1996 and P's suit was filed in May 2001, D moved for summary judgment. D also argued that P was not entitled to seek revocation of acceptance because no privity existed between P and D, and P could not prove the underlying breach of implied warranty claim. P argued that tender of delivery was to her and not the original purchaser that a lack of privity is not a bar to a claim for revocation of acceptance against a manufacturer who is also a warrantor. The court agreed with D and P appealed the grant of summary judgment. The appellate court reversed on counts I and III and affirmed the grant of summary judgment on count II. The appellate court held that P's right to bring a breach of written warranty action based on the promise to repair accrued when D failed to successfully repair her car after a reasonable number of attempts and that the four-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until that time. It held that P could properly pursue revocation of acceptance under the Magnuson-Moss Act if her breach of warranty claim was successful. D appealed.