Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Philadelphia, Inc.

673 F.3d 221 (2012)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P is a registered nurse with an associate's degree. P worked for D at two different times. Both on October 9, 2006, and on January 5, 2009, she signed the 'Employee Acknowledgment' form, which acknowledged receipt of the 'Fair Treatment Process' brochure ('FTP'). P alleges that she was not informed that she would have to commit to arbitration in order to be employed by D. The signed forms are only one-page long. It reads in part: 'I acknowledge that I have received a copy of the Tenet Fair Treatment Process brochure. . . . I hereby voluntarily agree to use the Company's Fair Treatment Process and to submit to final and binding arbitration any and all claims and disputes except 'Excluded Issues' that are related in any way to my employment or the termination of my employment with Tenet. I understand that final, and binding arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedy for any such claim or dispute against Tenet .....and that, by agreeing to use arbitration to resolve my dispute, both the Company and I agree to forego any right we each may have had to a jury trial on issues covered by the Fair Treatment Process. A limitations clause states that 'any request for arbitration under the FTP must be made within one year after the event giving rise to the dispute. . . . [or], if a longer limitations period is provided by a statute governing your claim, then your claim will be subject to the longer limitations period provided by the statute.' The FTP lists the six steps to resolve disputes and the approximate time for each. The FTP has provisions for fees; they require P to pay her own costs but then allow the arbitrator to award any remedy P would have had had P disputed the issue in court. P sued D under the Fair Labor Standards Act. D asserted the arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense. D motioned to compel arbitration. P claimed the agreement was unconscionable. The District Court held that genuine disputes of material fact remained as to whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable, and denied the motion to compel. D filed this appeal.