State v. Maduro

816 A.2d 432 (2002)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The affidavit submitted in support of the charges alleged that D engaged in a conspiracy to sell cocaine. The conspiracy consisted of D providing materials such as crack cocaine, cash, and scales to a juvenile, K.M., to hold for him when police searched his apartment. This included on one occasion, asking K.M. to give crack cocaine to an individual in exchange for cash at D's apartment while he was not there. D had delivered to K.M. roughly seventy-seven grams of crack cocaine to hold for him, which K.M. provided to the police when they contacted her in the course of investigating D's activities. P disclosed an additional witness it intended to call who would provide 'prior bad act' evidence. Merrow would testify that D provided him with powder and crack cocaine at their common workplace to sell between January and May 1999. D moved in limine to exclude the evidence. The court denied D's motion; it was direct evidence of the conspiracy itself and for the purpose of showing plan and intent on the conspiracy offense. There was a hung jury and on the second trial, D moved to exclude Merrow's testimony. P did not amend its information charging D with conspiracy in any way, nor did it bring any additional charges against D. The court did not change its original ruling from the first trial. Merrow testified that he had met D in jail and then later worked with him for the same employer. D approached him at work and asked if he would sell cocaine for him. Merrow agreed. Merrow stated that D did not know who his customers were and that he never brought the customers to D's apartment. He then testified that he remembered seeing a young girl at D's apartment on some of the occasions when he would visit to pick up drugs. He also testified, that the girl did not participate in his transactions, did not provide him with drugs or money, and was never a witness to the transfers from D. The court refused limiting instructions. The court instructed the jury that it could consider Merrow's testimony as direct evidence of the conspiracy charge involving K.M. D objected. D was convicted and appealed. D contends that the testimony was not direct evidence of the charged conspiracy, but was instead evidence of a separate uncharged conspiracy. D argues that the trial court erroneously determined that the Merrow testimony was directly relevant as res gestae evidence with respect to the charged conspiracy.