United States v. Dinitz

424 U.S. 600 (1976)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D was arrested for conspiracy to distribute LSD. D retained Jeffrey Meldon to represent him. Meldon was completely responsible for the preparation of the case until shortly before trial. Five days before the trial D retained another lawyer, Maurice Wagner, to conduct his defense. Wagner had not been admitted to practice in the jurisdiction but on the first day of the trial, the court permitted him to appear pro hac vice. Fletcher Baldwin, a professor of law at the University of Florida, also appeared on D's behalf. The jury was selected and sworn, and opening statements began. Wagner began his opening statement for the defense. Began to state an opinion and objection was sustained. Wagner then called this the Case of the Incredible Witness. The prosecution objected, and the judge excused the jury. The judge then warned Wagner that he did not approve of his behavior, and cautioned Wagner that he did not want to have to remind him again about the purpose of the opening statement. The trial judge found it necessary twice again to remind Wagner of the purpose of the opening statement and to instruct him to relate 'the facts that you expect the evidence to show the admissible evidence.' Wagner then started to discuss an attempt to extort money from D that had occurred shortly after his arrest. The prosecutor objected, and the jury was again excused. Wagner had no information linking Cox to the extortion attempt, and the trial judge then excluded Wagner from the trial and ordered him to leave the courthouse. The judge then asked Meldon if he was prepared to proceed with the trial. The judge gave Meldon until 9 o'clock the following morning to prepare. Meldon informed the judge that D was in a quandary. Meldon told the judge that D wanted Wagner, and not himself or Baldwin, to try the case. The judge set forth three alternative courses: (1) a stay or recess pending application to the Court of Appeals to review the propriety of expelling Wagner, (2) continuation of the trial with Meldon and Baldwin as counsel, or (3) a declaration of a mistrial which would permit the respondent to obtain other counsel. Meldon moved for a mistrial as being in D's best interest. P did not oppose the motion. The judge declared a mistrial, expressing his belief that such a course would serve the interest of justice. Before his second trial, D moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. This motion was denied. D represented himself at the new trial, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Double Jeopardy barred the second trial because there had been no manifest necessity requiring the expulsion of Wagner. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional question thus presented.