Waddington v. Sarausad

555 U.S. 179 (2009)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

A drive-by shooting was the culmination of a gang dispute between the 23d Street Diablos, of which P was a member, and the Bad Side Posse, which was headquartered at Ballard High School in Seattle, Washington. A Diablos member, Jerome Reyes, had been chased from Ballard by members of the Bad Side Posse. The Diablos decided to go 'to Ballard High School to show that the Diablos were not afraid' of the rival gang. The Diablos started a fight with the Bad Side Posse but left quickly after someone indicated that police were nearby. They went to a member's house, still angry because the Bad Side Posse had 'called them weak.' Brian Ronquillo retrieved a handgun, and the gang decided to return to Ballard and 'get their respect back.' P drove, with Ronquillo as a front passenger seat and Reyes and two other Diablos in the back. En route, someone in the car mentioned ''capping'' the Bad Side Posse, and Ronquillo tied a bandana over the lower part of his face and readied the handgun. A second car of Diablos pulled up next to P's car and the drivers of the two cars talked briefly. P asked the other driver, ''Are you ready?'' and then sped the rest of the way to the high school. In front of the school, P abruptly slowed to about five miles per hour while Ronquillo fired 6 to 10 shots at a group of students standing in front of it. P 'saw everyone go down,' and then sped away. One student was killed and another was wounded when a bullet fragment struck his leg. P, Ronquillo, and Reyes were tried for the first-degree murder of Melissa Fernandes, the attempted first-degree murders of Ryan Lam and Tam Nguyen, and the second-degree assault of Brent Mason. P and Reyes, who were tried as accomplices, argued at trial that they could not have been accomplices to murder because they 'had no idea whatsoever that Ronquillo had armed himself for the return trip.' They claimed they expected another fistfight with the Bad Side Posse and were 'totally and utterly dismayed when Ronquillo started shooting.' P testified that he considered only the 'possibility of a fight,' but never the possibility of a shooting. The prosecutor imputed knowledge to P in that he had 'slowed down before the shots were fired, stayed slowed down until the shots were over and immediately sped up.' 'There was no hesitation, there was no stopping the car. There was no attempt for P to swerve his car out of the way so that innocent people wouldn't get shot.' A jury instruction provided, in relevant part: 'A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she either: '(1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime or '(2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing the crime.' P was convicted. On appeal, P argued that because the State did not prove that he had intent to kill, he could not be convicted as an accomplice to second-degree murder under Washington law. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, explaining that under Washington law, an accomplice must have 'general knowledge' that the crime will occur, but need not have the specific intent required for that crime's commission. The court referred to accomplice liability as 'a theory of criminal liability that in Washington has been reduced to the maxim, 'in for a dime, in for a dollar.'' In another case, the Washington Supreme Court clarified that 'in for a dime, in for a dollar' is not the best descriptor of accomplice liability under Washington law because an accomplice must have knowledge of 'the crime' that occurs. It is error, then, to instruct a jury that an accomplice's knowledge of ''a crime'' was sufficient to establish accomplice liability for ''the crime.'' P sought state habeas relief. P argued the jury may have convicted him as an accomplice to second-degree murder based solely on his admission that he anticipated that an assault would occur at Ballard High School. It was denied. P filed in federal court under §2254. The District Court granted the petition. It found there was 'ample evidence that the jury was confused about what elements had to be established in order for P to be found guilty of second-degree murder and second-degree attempted murder.' The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.