P lived in Las Vegas, with his wife, Laura, their 3-year-old daughter Honesty, and Laura's 6-year-old daughter from a previous relationship, Autumn. Autumn said that P had frequently forced her to engage in numerous and varied sexual acts with him. Autumn said that P had frequently forced her to engage in numerous and varied sexual acts with him. P denied any wrongdoing. Two days later, Laura called a rape crisis hotline and brought Autumn to the hospital for an examination. Detective Zinovitch attempted to interview Autumn but found her too distressed to discuss the assaults. Detective Zinovitch then ordered a rape examination, which revealed strong physical evidence of sexual assaults. Two days later, Detective Zinovitch interviewed Autumn in the presence of her mother, and at that time, Autumn provided a detailed description of acts of sexual assault carried out. Autumn also demonstrated those acts using anatomically correct dolls. P was arrested, and a state grand jury indicted him on four counts of sexual assault on a minor under 14 years of age. At the preliminary hearing, Autumn testified that she understood the difference between a truth and a lie, but she became upset when asked about the assaults. She initially agreed that P had touched her in a way that '[she] didn't think he was supposed to touch [her].' But she later stated that she could not remember how P had touched her or what she had told her mother or the detective. The trial court found the testimony of Laura and Detective Zinovitch to be sufficient to hold P for trial. At trial, Autumn was too distressed to be sworn in. Under the Nevada statute, out-of-court statements made by a child under 10 years of age describing acts of sexual assault or physical abuse of the child may be admitted if the court finds that the child is unavailable or unable to testify and that 'the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.' P claimed that admission of this testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause. Laura and Detective Zinovitch were permitted at trial to recount Autumn's out-of-court statements. Laura testified that P was the only male who had had the opportunity to assault Autumn. The prosecution introduced evidence regarding Autumn's medical exam. P denied the assaults, and P brought out the fact that Autumn, unlike many children her age, had acquired some knowledge about sexual acts, since she had seen P and her mother engaging in sexual intercourse and had become familiar with sexual terms. P was found guilty and appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court handed down its final decision in 1993 and affirmed the conviction. The court cited the 'natural spontaneity' of Autumn's initial statements to her mother, her reiteration of the same account to Detective Zinovitch several days later, her use of anatomically correct dolls to demonstrate the assaults, and her detailed descriptions of sexual acts with which a 6-year-old would generally not be familiar. P filed a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court dismissed the petition; the Nevada Supreme Court's decision was not ''contrary to'' and did not ''involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. P appealed. Crawford was decided and held that 'testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial' are admissible 'only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].' On appeal P now contended that if the rule in Crawford had been applied, Autumn's out-of-court statements could not have been admitted into evidence and the jury would not have convicted him. P claimed the Crawford rule was either (1) an old rule in existence at the time of his conviction or (2) a ''watershed'' rule that implicated 'the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.' The Ninth Circuit held that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. It announced a new rule of criminal procedure that 'reworked our understanding of bedrock criminal procedure.' The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, with nine judges dissenting. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.