This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

Yusuf picked up two men in northwest Denver. Both men were visibly intoxicated. Once in the cab, they refused to provide Yusuf with a destination, instead telling him when and where to turn as he drove. Glinton, one of the passengers, finally told Yusuf to pull over but then began to argue over the $6.50 fare. The argument escalated, and Glinton grabbed Yusuf from behind and began to punch him repeatedly. P had called a cab and was waiting for it to arrive. He watched Yusuf's cab pass by and, believing the cab was for him, followed it down the road. After walking a few blocks, P heard Yusuf cry for help. As he neared the cab, Garcia saw Glinton attacking Yusuf from the back seat. P approached the driver's side of the cab and told Glinton to stop. Glinton told P to mind his own business, but P refused to leave. Eventually, both Yusuf and Glinton exited the cab. Glinton then assaulted P before getting into the driver's seat of the cab. As he drove away, Glinton hit P's knee with the vehicle. After briefly driving down the street with the stolen cab, Glinton turned around and accelerated toward Yusuf and P, who were standing in the middle of the street. The two dodged the vehicle. Glinton sped by. and then spun the cab around a second time and again quickly accelerated. Yusuf sought refuge behind a light pole. P remained exposed in the middle of the street, and Glinton ran over him with the cab. Glinton then continued driving, dragging Pa into a nearby parking lot. He finally stopped, shifted the cab into reverse, and hit P again before driving off. The entire ordeal lasted around seven minutes, and only four minutes elapsed between P approaching the cab and Glinton assaulting him with it. P suffered extensive injuries, including shattered eardrums, a traumatic brain injury, a fractured eye socket, three broken ribs, numerous torn ligaments, and other injuries that continue to cause hip and back pain. P sued D for negligence and unjust enrichment claiming D breached its duty of care to Yusuf by failing to install a partition between the front and back seats of the cab and by failing to install interior cameras. P argued that he qualified as a rescuer and, under the rescue doctrine, D owed him a duty of care, which it also breached. D moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Colorado Cab owed Garcia a duty of care under the rescue doctrine. The jury awarded P $1,605,000 in damages, attributing 45% fault to D and 55% fault to Glinton. D then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court also denied. D appealed, raising issues of duty, causation, and setoff. P cross-appealed. The court addressed only the issue of duty, holding that D owed P no duty of care. P appealed. The court held that P qualified as a rescuer and that D's duty to Yusuf extended to P. The court reversed and remanded to the appeals court. On remand, the Court of Appeals addressed proximate cause. It held that although an intervening cause may break the causal chain in some situations, even intentionally tortious or criminal acts won't if the act was foreseeable and 'the harm at issue was within the scope of the risks reasonably to be foreseen from the defendant's conduct or the rescuer's efforts.' In rescuer scenarios, the Third Restatement of Torts requires consideration of 'whether, at the outset of that particular rescue, the risk of such harm would reasonably be anticipated.' The court concluded that Glinton's initial assault against Yusuf was foreseeable. Under the rescue doctrine, P's attempt to rescue Yusuf was also reasonably foreseeable. D was thus liable for the injuries P sustained when Glinton assaulted him outside the cab. P's injuries resulting from Glinton's theft and use of the cab as a weapon were neither 'within the scope of the risk' that made D's failure to install safety features in the cab tortious nor the type of risk of harm 'reasonably to be expected to arise in the course of a rescue of a cab driver being assaulted by a passenger.' As a matter of law, Glinton's theft of the cab and subsequent use of the cab as a weapon were superseding causes that absolved D of liability for P's injuries related to that conduct. P appealed again.

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