This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

The jurisdiction issue arises out of claims for wrongful exposure to asbestos. Ralph and Sandra Cepec (Ps), are residents of Georgia. Genuine (D) and the other companies sued are associated with the manufacture, distribution, or installation of products containing asbestos. Between approximately 1988 and 1991, P worked for D in a warehouse in Jacksonville, Florida. In 2015, Ps sued Ds in Delaware. Five of the seven defendants are Delaware corporations. D is a Georgia corporation whose principal place of business is in Atlanta. D has never had a corporate office in Delaware, does not conduct its board or shareholder meetings, and does not have any officers in Delaware. Fewer than 1% of its employees work in Delaware, fewer than 1% of its auto-parts stores are here, and less than 1% of its revenue comes from Delaware. D is registered to do business in Delaware under §371 and has a designated agent for service of process in Wilmington in accordance with §376. D moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of general and specific personal jurisdiction. Ps argued that D had consented to Delaware's general jurisdiction by registering to do business in this state and appointing an in-state agent for service of process. The Superior Court agreed with Ps. The court explained that it was persuaded to adhere to the Sternberg case by three decisions from the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware issued after Daimler, which determined that 'express consent-by registering to do business in a state in accordance with state statutes-remains a valid basis for personal jurisdiction.'

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