This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

A six-day-old 1991 Ford Aerostar driven by P suddenly accelerated, resulting in an accident from which P sustained serious injuries. P sued D claiming that D was negligent and should be held strictly liable for the design of the Aerostar's cruise control mechanism. P pled causes of action under theories of negligence and strict products liability. P and D proposed jury instructions to the court before trial, requesting the judge instruct the jury on negligence and strict products liability. In response, the judge wrote to the parties asking them to 'clarify their positions with respect to the appropriate causes of action in this case.' The court inquired, inter alia, whether 'it would be sensible' to follow the approach taken in Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1999), 'in which the plaintiff withdrew his negligence cause of action as duplicative of his strict liability claim,' stating that the court's research 'indicates a substantial overlap in the elements of negligence and strict liability claims for defective design.' P stood fast for both instructions. D replied that one or the other must be given but not both. Subsequently, at the pretrial conference, D’s attorney stated that it wanted the negligence instruction to remain. Ultimately D did not object to both of the instructions, and the jury was so charged. After a two-week trial, the jury found that the cruise control system was not 'designed in a defective manner,' but that D nevertheless 'was negligent in the design of the cruise control system' and that this was a substantial factor in causing the accident. D moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that the only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that P never applied the brake pedal during the accident, but mistakenly applied the accelerator.' D also claimed that the jury's verdict was inconsistent because D could not have negligently designed the cruise control if there was no defect in its design. The district court granted the motions and entered judgment for D in that D did not waive its objection to the jury instruction as it was preserved in its letter to the court. P moved for relief from the final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), alleging that D had engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, and misconduct by withholding from P and from the district court documents that the court had ordered to be produced, by making false claims, and by presenting false testimony. The district court denied the motion. P appealed.

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