Jones v. Perry

215 F.Supp.3d 563 (2016)

Facts

P and Sauer were teenagers when they first met at Westport Middle School in 1994. They dated for a month, after which Sauer moved away with her family. P spent a lot of time 'in and out of juvenile institutions and prison for a variety of non-violent charges' over the next ten years. When he finally exited the prison system, P began looking for her. In 2014, he ran into an old middle school classmate who was still friends with Sauer. Sauer had experienced her own share of legal trouble over the years, and that she was currently serving a long-term prison sentence. P and Sauer began exchanging letters and talking on the phone. This led to a rekindled romantic relationship. P obtained approval to visit her at the Kentucky Correctional Institution for Women (KCIW). At their first in-person encounter since middle school, P proposed marriage. She said yes. He has continued to visit her 'twice a week nearly every week since then.' Sauer is not eligible for parole until June of 2026. P does not believe he can 'or should wait until then to solidify their bond before God and the Commonwealth of Kentucky.' State officials have consistently thwarted the couple's attempts to marry. P reports that he has contacted 'numerous county clerks' throughout the Commonwealth and 'not one [will] agree to grant [the couple] a marriage license.' D is a clerk and she told P that 'her office interprets Kentucky law as saying both parties must be present to issue a marriage license.' Warden Janet Conover informed P that she had 'no objection to the marriage,' but that 'both parties must be present [at the clerk's office] to obtain a license and [the prison does] not transport inmates for this reason.' The first official reason was a memo noted that marriage license applications have 'signature places for both the bride and groom.' Because KRS § 402.110 states that clerks must 'see to it that every blank space required to be filled by the applicant is so filled before delivering' a marriage license, it determined that 'the county clerk in each county must have both parties sign the application and both must be present at that time.' The Attorney General (AG) expressed a very different opinion. The AG declined to issue a formal opinion 'because litigation [was] being contemplated,' but did note that the in-person requirement likely interfered with a prisoner's fundamental right to marry. The AG affirmed that 'public officials cannot sit on their hands and frustrate an incarcerated person's right to marry,' and advised the state to adopt 'procedures . . . to assist incarcerated persons in exercising' that right. P again walked into the Shelby County Clerk's Office. D refused to issue him a marriage license. He then filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this Court, arguing that Perry's in-person requirement violates his 'fundamental right to marry . . . which is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.'