This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

D posted to its website a list of frequently asked questions about international-adoption fee schedules. A postscript, one of the answers mentioned that 'a soft referral is not [an] acceptable practice under the regulations and may lead to adverse action.' Eventually, D defined what it meant by 'soft referrals' as two categories of adoption practices. The first is the act of 'informing [prospective adoptive parents] about a specific child before the country of origin has determined that the child is eligible for intercountry adoption . . ., even if the [agency] does not communicate the name of the child to the [parents].' The second - and 'more common' - category is 'the act of matching a child to a family before . . . approval of the prospective adoptive parents' (PAP) home study and associated background checks.' This generated more questions and D again updated its website. It said an adoption service provider may sometimes informally match a child to prospective parents before parents complete their home study. But the provider cannot 'hold' the child's file for those prospective parents in a way that (1) prevents other providers from referring the child to other parents, (2) discourages other parents from adopting the child, or (3) prevents authorities from considering alternative parents. J.A. 64. The new webpage also claimed the 'soft referral guidance clarifies existing policies based on current regulations that have been in place since 2006.' The new webpage also claimed the 'soft referral guidance clarifies existing policies based on current regulations that have been in place since 2006.' P sued D, arguing that the Guidance violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). P claimed the Guidance required notice and comment and was otherwise arbitrary and capricious. D moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that P lacked associational standing because its complaint failed to identify a member of D injured by the Guidance. D explained that the Guidance only prohibited two specific types of soft referrals: (1) matching a non-eligible child to prospective parents or (2) matching a child to parents who haven't completed a home study in a way that prevents the child from being considered by other prospective parents (i.e., holding). Other types of soft referrals, such as matching a child to parents who haven't completed a home study without restricting the child from consideration by other prospective parents, were permissible. While the motion to dismiss was pending, both parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court agreed with D that the Guidance prohibited only two types of soft referrals: (1) matching parents to a child not yet eligible for adoption and (2) 'holding' an adoptable child for parents who have not yet completed their home studies by preventing other potential parents from connecting with the child. The court also agreed with D that P's motion-to-dismiss declarations mischaracterized the Guidance as prohibiting all soft referrals and did not specify that any members engaged in the two prohibited types. The court concluded that P lacked standing and granted the motion to dismiss.

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