This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

P was hospitalized in April and May 1989, for burns suffered during a work-related accident. P was given a blood transfusion. P was unconscious at the time and her mother signed a consent form for the transfusion. That form stated in part, 'In making such request and in giving such consent, I hereby acknowledge that I have been informed that there is no known definitive test for the determination of the existence or non-existence of viral hepatitis in blood and that I fully understand that the transfusion or administration of blood or blood components to me may result in viral hepatitis or other untoward reactions.' In 1990, D advised P to be tested for HIV. The test returned a negative reading. In August 2000, D notified P by letter that she should be tested for HCV because her blood donor had recently tested positive for the virus. P was positive for HCV. P sued D for constructive fraud, medical negligence, medical battery, and ordinary negligence. P alleged that as early as 1996-7 there was a reliable test for HCV and that the NIH recommended that individuals who had received blood transfusions prior to 1990 should be tested for HCVD filed a motion to dismiss all counts as time-barred. The court agreed and dismissed P's complaint with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed. P appealed. P argues that the circuit and appellate courts erred in holding that the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose applies to bar her claim for ordinary negligence.

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