This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

D was charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. D claimed that he is not guilty of criminal sexual conduct because the complainant, Sharon Preston, consented to any and all sexual contact that D had with Preston. The court instructed the jury: 'If the evidence does not convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual acts complained of were not consented to, then the defendant is not guilty of the crime of [sic] conduct.' D contends that the trial court should have given this instruction: 'if a defendant entertains a reasonable and bona fide belief that a prosecutrix voluntarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse,' the jury should find the defendant not guilty. D was convicted and appealed.

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