This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

Whitfield (D) had a history of drunk driving. D was drinking such that his blood alcohol level was at least .27 percent when he crossed the centerline into oncoming traffic and collided head-on with another vehicle killing the driver. When D was found in his car, he was unconscious with a number of empty cans of malt liquor. During trial, D argued that his blood alcohol level was so high that he would have become stuporous and lose consciousness and thus he could not possess implied malice for murder. Expert evidence showed that people become stuporous at a blood alcohol level of .25. The trial court's jury instruction for the crime of murder included the defense of intoxication to negate the mental state of the crime. The trial court also carefully distinguished the mental state required for murder from the lesser offense of gross vehicular manslaughter. The court instructed that malice was implied when the killing resulted from an intentional act, when the intentional act and its consequences were dangerous to human life, and the act was deliberately performed by the defendant with knowledge of the danger and a conscious disregard for human life. If the defendant did not realize the risks involved the crime would be manslaughter. The court also instructed regarding the awareness element of malice and of the need to find a higher degree of risk inherent in the act than merely gross negligence. The court refused to give an instruction regarding D's alleged state of unconsciousness mitigating the crime to involuntary manslaughter. D had an extensive history of drunken driving offenses and was convicted of second-degree murder. D appealed based on the refusal to instruct concerning unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication.

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