This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) renders deportable any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) renders deportable any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the United States. The INA defines “aggravated felony” including in part “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18 . . . ) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” A “crime of violence” is “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or “(b)any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Section §16(b) requires a court to ask whether “the ordinary case” of an offense poses the requisite risk. Immigration Judges employed that analysis concluded that Dimaya (D) is deportable as an aggravated felon. D was convicted of first-degree burglary under California law. Following his second offense, P initiated a removal proceeding against him. Both an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that California first-degree burglary is a “crime of violence” under §16(b). They reasoned that the offense “carries a substantial risk of the use of force.” D appealed. Pending appeal, this Court held unconstitutional part of the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). A violent felony was “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that- “(i)has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or “(ii)is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The Court declared that clause “void for vagueness” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit held that §16(b) was also unconstitutionally vague and accordingly ruled in D’s favor.

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