This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

D was indicted on one count of conspiracy to transport stolen securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314. D's co-conspirators pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to plea agreements. On the day D's trial was set to begin, he entered into a plea agreement with the government and pleaded guilty. The agreement set forth facts supporting the elements of the conspiracy charge and contained assurances that D was aware of the constitutional and statutory rights he was waiving. D agreed that if the plea was withdrawn he shall assert no claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that D's statements pursuant to this agreement, or any leads derived therefrom, should be suppressed or are inadmissible at any trial, hearing, or other proceeding. D affirmed he was not threatened or coerced into pleading guilty. After the plea was entered, D obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion claimed Mitchell had a 'fair and just reason' to withdraw his plea. D claimed his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his previous counsel had pressured him into pleading guilty. The district court denied it, finding the 'Rule 11 colloquy here clearly demonstrates that [D] entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.' D filed a motion to reconsider. He submitted two letters, one addressed to D's brother, and encouraged him to convince D to accept the plea deal. Counsel stated, 'I can no longer talk to Dino, if only because he won't listen to me, because I won't say what he wants to hear.' The other letter was written directly to D and discussed trial strategy as well as the prison sentence D would likely receive with and without accepting the plea agreement. Counsel opined, 'Dino, you would be a fool not to take this plea offer!!' The district court granted D's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court expressed concern about the possible 'undue influence' exerted by D's counsel, especially 'considering D's lack of reading skills, lack of education, and general lack of understanding of the legal system.' It nonetheless found D's plea to have been knowing and voluntary. The court determined D's constitutional right to a jury trial weighed in favor of granting his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. P sought to admit statements D made in connection with his guilty plea. D claimed admission of these statements would be more prejudicial than probative, in violation of Rule 403. The court ruled for P. P told the jury D had admitted under oath the charged offense. A government witness described the hearing in which Mitchell pleaded guilty and read portions of the plea colloquy transcript in which D admitted to the facts of the offense. During cross-examination of D, the government questioned him regarding his guilty plea. Finally, the government again emphasized Mitchell's guilty plea during its closing argument. D was convicted and appealed.

The legal issues presented in this case will be displayed here.

The court's holding and decision will be displayed here.

Legal analysis from Dean's Law Dictionary will be displayed here.