This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

P sustained injuries to her left foot while working for D. P had to use crutches due to her injury. Although still employed, she stopped working at the Hospital on November 7, 1994 and filed a workers' compensation claim. P began drawing temporary disability and ongoing medical payments from D's workers' compensation administrator. On January 10, 1995, while still on crutches, P went to D to receive medical treatment for her injury. P slipped and fell on a watery liquid substance in one of D's hallways. The fall aggravated the previous injury to P's left foot, resulting in a condition of chronic intense pain. On January 25, 1995, P was laid off from her job at the Hospital due to downsizing. On December 12, 1995, P filed this personal injury action against D. D filed an answer alleging as an affirmative defense the exclusivity of P's workers' compensation remedy under sections 3600, 3601, 3602, and 5300. D filed a motion for summary judgment based on the sole ground that P's 'exclusive remedy is her ongoing Workers' Compensation action and the instant civil action is statutorily barred under Labor Code sections 3600 and 3602.' D argued that P was its employee at the time of the January 10, 1995, accident, and was present on that date in order to receive medical treatment for a previous injury suffered in the course of her employment, for which she was receiving workers' compensation benefits. D claims the 'conditions of compensation' existed between P and D at the time of her injury, and her exclusive remedy was under the workers' compensation law, and her complaint against D was therefore barred under section 3602, subdivision (a). D argued that the 'dual capacity' doctrine is inapplicable to a premises liability action against an employer as owner or occupier of real property. P argued that at the time of the accident on January 10, 1995, D was acting in its capacity as a medical facility rendering care to her as a member of the public, and not as P's employer. Thus the 'conditions of compensation' were not met, and P was not restricted to the remedy of workers' compensation. P was at the Hospital as a patient rather than as an employee, and D was acting as a medical provider and not as an employer. D argued she could not rely on the dual capacity 'exception' to the rule of workers' compensation exclusivity. The trial court ruled that the doctrine of dual capacity is inapplicable under Labor Code section 3602[, subdivision] (a) since the D's duty to provide safe premises pre-existed the injury.' The trial court entered judgment for D. P appealed.

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