This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

There are two providers in the York Medical Service Area (York MSA). D which is run by M.D.s and Memorial which is run by D.O.s. D dominates with an 80% market share and offers many more procedures. D’s corporate charter and bylaws of the medical staff barred D.O.s. Fundamentally any D.O. patient was forfeited to D if that patient needed some of D’s custom care. The absence of staff privileges at D for Ps was a serious competitive disadvantage. In 1974 D amended its corporate charter to allow osteopathic physicians to practice at D. The medical staff bylaws still banned them. Ps, both of whom were engaged in family practice in the York MSA, applied for staff privileges at D. D's medical staff considered the applications and amended their bylaws to permit the admission of osteopaths. Ps contend that the amendment of the bylaws was purely cosmetic, and that since 1976 D's medical staff has engaged in a deliberate covert policy of discrimination against osteopaths. Ps sued D under the Sherman Act. Ps showed evidence that D had a historical presumption in favor of admitting any M.D. who applied for staff privileges, regardless of the applicant's medical ability or social graces. In the case of D.O. applicants D engaged in 'strict scrutiny' of the applicant's medical qualifications, and, in addition, considered the applicant's social acceptability. If the D.O. was found lacking, even minimally, the application was denied. Ps adduced evidence that in the evaluation process for D.O.'s (but not M.D.'s), D relied on hearsay as grounds for rejecting an application for staff privileges. Ps also offered evidence that D automatically gave any D.O. who survived the strict scrutiny of that process the lowest category of staff privileges offered by D, that of 'Assistant Staff,' regardless of the D.O.'s actual skill level. D.O.s were required to consult with other members of the department in the care and treatment of their patients. In 1976 Ps applied for staff privileges. Ps went through the screening process but Ds took the unusual step of deciding to conduct a further investigation. A Committee made extensive oral and written inquiries concerning the professional competence and moral character of both Ps. No such survey had ever been conducted by Ds before. Hearsay evidence was discovered against Weiss (P) about his medical competence and he was denied privileges. Reconsideration of the decision was granted. The Committee revealed that almost everyone to whom they spoke acknowledged that Weiss (P) has had personality problems in the past which have caused him to have difficult interpersonal relations with other members of the staff. His application was rejected after making the rounds again. A 'Judicial Review' Committee was impaneled. Weiss (P) was present and represented by counsel at the proceeding. Once again Ds denied Weiss (P) privileges. Weiss'(P) complaint alleged that his application for staff privileges was denied because of: (1) a concerted refusal to deal with him and all other osteopathic physicians located in and around York, Pennsylvania, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; (2) monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) violation of Pennsylvania antitrust and common law. The court reached the following conclusions of law: 1. On the § 1 claim, the staff (but not the hospital) is liable to the plaintiff class but not to Weiss (P); 2. On the § 2 claims, D (but not the staff) is liable to both Weiss (P) and the class for monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize; 3. On the pendent state law claims, the hospital (but not the staff) and four physicians are liable to Weiss (P) but not the class for interference with contractual relations; and 4. The remaining six physician defendants are not liable to anyone for anything. The court granted Ps injunctive relief. The court held Ds liable to Ps for violations of Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, along with tortiously interfering with his contractual relations with third parties. Everybody appealed.

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